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BRIAN LAPIERRE
MAKING HOOLIGANISM ON A MASS SCALE
The campaign against petty hooliganism 
in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964*
Hooliganism was a persistent problem in the Soviet Union and the subject of
periodic anti-crime campaigns in the pre-World War II period.1 But in the mid-
1950s, it reached a tipping point. In 1956, convictions for hooliganism exploded
and a wave of deviant activity swept through the country that was noted as new and
unheralded. “Hooliganism is not getting less,” a group of workers noted
1. Hooliganism, in the Soviet Union, was more than just a term of admonition. It was a crime
that covered everything from using foul language to knife fighting and for which one could be
imprisoned (from three days to five years) or fined. Hooliganism was defined (post-1960) as
“intentional actions that rudely violate public order and express clear disrespect for society.”
There were two types of criminal hooliganism differentiated according to seriousness and
punishment: simple hooliganism (prostoe khuliganstvo), for which punishments ranged from
fines to one year in prison, and malicious hooliganism (zlostnoe khuliganstvo), for which
prison sentences ranged from three to five years. For hooliganism in the pre-Revolutionary
period, see Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900-
1914 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1993). For hooliganism in the Soviet
Union during the NEP era, see Anne Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts,
Bohemians and Delinquents (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2000), 167-176 and
N. B. Lebina Povsednevnaia zhizn' sovetskogo goroda: normy i anomalii 1920/1930 gody
(SPb: Letnii sad, 1999), 57-68. Peter Solomon explores hooliganism in the Stalin and
post-Khrushchev periods in Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin (New York: Cambridge
* The research for this article was made possible by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation
Research Abroad Grant with funds provided by the United States Department of Education and
by an International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) Regional Scholar Exchange
Program Fellowship with funds provided by the US Department of State’s Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs. The views aired in this article are mine and do not represent
the position of either of the organizations listed above. I would like to thank the University of
Chicago’s Russian Studies Workshop, Sheila Fitzpatrick, Richard Hellie, Klaus Gestwa, Marc
Élie and the two anonymous reviewers for the Cahiers for their critical comments on previous
drafts of this paper. Any problems that remain in it are, however, mine alone. As always, I
would like to thank Manuela and Aline for their goodwill and support.
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alarmingly. “With every passing day, it is growing more and more.”2 Showing a
69 percent increase from 1953 to 1956, statistics confirmed that hooliganism had,
as a man from Riazan´ noted in a letter to Pravda, “surpassed all previous bounds.”3
In 1956, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) decided to
crack down on the rising hooligan problem not by giving a small number of people
heavy prison sentences, but by giving a large number of people light ones. By
decreasing punishments rather than increasing them, the RSFSR took a
counterintuitive approach to rising crime rates and reversed its former approach to
anti-hooligan campaigning. In the mid-1930s, the state had created a more serious
form of deviance (malicious hooliganism) and heavier prison terms (three to five
years) in order to combat dangerous forms of hooliganism involving physical
assaults and knife fighting.4 With the passage of the petty hooligan decree, they did
the opposite. They created a less serious form of hooliganism and a less serious
form of hooligan punishment in order to combat this multivalent criminal
category’s most minor and mundane manifestations. In the months following the
RSFSR’s 19 December 1956 decree, all the union republics would pass similar
petty hooligan legislation.
Before the creation of petty hooliganism, minor anti-social offenses were often
allowed to slide through the criminal justice system unpunished because local
police, prosecutors and judges lacked lenient sentencing options or were unwilling
to devote scarce investigative and judicial resources to non-serious offenses.5 With
the promulgation of petty hooliganism, the state ordered local law enforcement to
go after minor offenders and gave them a fast-track punishment process and a petty
variant of hooliganism with which to pursue and process them. By creating a new
form of hooliganism that coupled little offenses to light punishments, the state
inserted degrees of deviancy into hooliganism and made it into a flexible catchall
2. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f. r-9474, Verkhovnyi sud SSSR,
op. 10, d. 147, l. 52. 
3. GARF, f. r-8131, Prokuratura SSSR, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 44. In 1953, Soviet criminal courts
convicted 116,592 persons of hooliganism. In 1956, the number of convictions increased to
196,558. For the Pravda letter, see ibid., d. 5206, l. 29. 
4. Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin, 224-225.
5. The residents of Leningrad’s Fruzenskii raion, complained that: “The police often do not
press charges in such ‘trifles’ or if they do then the procuracy drops them because of the
insignificance of the crime. But we think such trivial actions as striking a stranger or cursing are
hooliganism” (GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4597, l. 30). A November 1955 report of the USSR
Procuracy noted that hooligan cases “only go to court when the hooliganism takes an extreme
and cynical form. Until this [point], a person committing hooliganism is frequently not
punished” (ibid., d. 3338, l. 92-93). 
University Press, 1996), 58-59, 224-225, 330-332 and Soviet Criminologists and Criminal
Policy: Specialists in Policy-Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 81-90.
Valerii Chalidze has a useful chapter on hooliganism in his Ugolovnaia Rossiia (New York:
Khronika Press, 1977), 123-148 as does V. A. Kozlov in his Massovye besporiadki v SSSR pri
Khrushcheve i Brezhneve (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1999), 184-216. For an
idiosyncratic look at hooliganism, see V. I. Shaposhnikov, Khuligani i khuliganstvo v Rossii:
aspekt istorii i literatury XX veka (M.: Moskovskii litsei, 2000).
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category that could be ratcheted up or watered down to fit any occasion or action no
matter how small or non-serious.6 
Ending the atmosphere of impunity that reigned around minor misbehavior was
important because unpunished minor misbehavior was, according to many jurists,
one of the root causes of major crime.7 Unpunished minor offenders, they argued,
were emboldened to try more serious offenses, devolved farther down the slippery
slope of deviancy and developed into tomorrow’s hardened criminals. By allowing
police and judges to go after the little stuff, the petty hooligan decree went after the
seemingly small misdeeds from which serious deviant disturbances and criminality
later arose.8
With its peculiar blend of increased prosecutions and decreased punishments, the
decree on petty hooliganism mixed hard line anti-crime policies with the new soft-
line tactics of the Thaw period. It decriminalized non-serious hooliganism by
making it into an administrative offense. It abandoned the harsh mandatory one to
five year prison sentences found in the criminal codes and created a new three to
fifteen day prison sentence for petty hooligans that was to be spent performing
mandatory physical labor. The convicted petty hooligan would not be burdened with
a criminal record upon release and his job would be held for him during his
detention. Emphasizing the key soft-line word the regime used to differentiate itself
from the Stalinist past and the capitalist West, the architects of the petty hooligan
decree stressed its “humane” (gumannyi) nature.9 Scholars of Soviet law have,
likewise, interpreted the petty hooligan decree as a liberalizing reform of the Thaw
period: one in a series of mid-1950s liberalization measures that included, most
famously, reducing punishments for petty theft of state and public property (1955).10
6. A key lobbyist for differentiating deviancy, USSR Minister of Justice K. P. Gorshenin, noted
at a July 1954 meeting: “There are various types of hooliganism. There are cases when they
bring to responsibility a law-abiding person who while in a drunken state causes a ruckus. But
there is another type of hooliganism in which a person inspires fear in the residents of some
settlement. We must distinguish between such things. [These less serious offenders] must
answer for the actions they have committed but not to the same degree as malicious hooligans.”
GARF, f. r-7523, Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR, op. 45, d. 18, l. 17.
7. The USSR Procuracy argued, for instance, that: “The main reason for the growth of crime is
that a significant number of people go unpunished. An atmosphere has been created in which
criminals […] [believe that] they will be able to avoid punishment.” GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32,
d. 3338, l. 92-93.
8. Hooliganism, according to legal experts, was a “primary school (nachal´naia shkola) for the
commission of more serious crimes.” Every fourth criminal recidivist convicted of murder,
rape or robbery was earlier convicted of hooliganism. For hooliganism as a gateway crime, see
N. F. Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie khuliganstva,” in A. A. Gertsenzon,
Kriminologiia (M.: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1968), 439.
9. At a June 1957 meeting, the head of the USSR Procuracy, R. A. Rudenko, called the decree
“humane” because it “serves as a warning, does not have serious consequences, allows the
person to keep his job and gives him the possibility to reform himself.” GARF, f. r-7523,
op. 45, d. 32, l. 7.
10. For interpretations of the petty hooligan decree as a form of liberalization, see Harold
Berman, Justice in the USSR: An Interpretation of Soviet Law (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1963), 73 and Solomon, Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy, 81.
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However, the petty hooligan decree was not just about reducing punishment. It
was about universalizing punishment. It was about winning the battle against
hooliganism by punishing every hooligan from the trivial to the terrible. With the
decree on petty hooliganism, the state declared war on minor misbehavior and
announced a new era of post-Stalinist social discipline and control focused on the
mundane, the ordinary and the everyday. By unveiling a new zero tolerance policy
towards the slightest signs of anti-social behavior, the state signaled its new
willingness to combat the embarrassing everyday incivilities that spoiled Soviet byt
and generated negative publicity in the Cold War era clash of civilizations.11 
The petty hooligan decree created a new type of hooliganism. It also created new
types of hooligans. It made it possible for a growing number of people to be made
into deviants, fitted with outsider identities and stigmatized. The petty hooligan
decree, by watering down the definition of hooliganism, transformed the
commonplace borderline behaviors of the everyday into imprisoning offenses. By
defining deviance downward, it made millions of ordinary citizens, whose
behaviors would earlier have escaped punishment, into accidental hooligans;
exposed them to police power that was often arbitrary and unregulated; and
dragged them through a degrading and demeaning detention process. 
In the 1956 RSFSR Supreme Soviet decree, petty hooliganism was defined as a
“violation of public order and peace, insolent (oskorbitel´noe) disrespect to
citizens, the use of obscenity (skvernoslovie) and other indecent acts.”12 In
ambiguous and open language, the decree signaled the state’s intent to punish
anything it interpreted as incorrect conduct. The open-ended tag phrase (“and other
indecent acts”) hinted at the program’s potential for unchecked expansion and
abuse. It set the stage for petty hooliganism to grow from an ambitious anti-
deviancy program into a mass persecutory process that would envelop millions of
Soviet citizens annually.13 
Creating an avalanche of new offenders
In their efforts to fight hooliganism, the state unleashed a petty hooligan program
that inflated hooligan-related arrests to unprecedented proportions. In the mid-
11. On 7 December 1956 (less than two weeks before the RSFSR petty hooligan decree was
released), an official at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) sent Central Committee
Secretary P. N. Pospelov a note on a September 1956 article about the Soviet Union published in
the Observer entitled “Speculators and Hooligans.” By concentrating on such negative
phenomena as stiliagi and “cases of public, unpunished hooliganism,” the article, the MID
official argued, gave a bad impression of the USSR. He demanded that something be done about
deviancy in the run-up to the arrival of the foreign delegations for the 1957 International Youth
Festival. The official closed his note by suggesting that the government “turn its attention […] to
possible measures that would stop similar phenomena in the future.” Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi
arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), f. 5, Apparat TsK KPSS, op. 30, d. 179, l. 87.
12. “Ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,” Pravda, 21 (December, 1956): 5.
13. GARF, f. r-7523, op. 45, d. 333, l. 68. 
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1950s, hooligan conviction rates in the USSR had increased rapidly, but had risen
above the level of 200,000 convictions per year only once, in 1958. By contrast, the
petty hooligan program resulted in the detention of over 1.4 million people annually
during the first few years of its enforcement and the numbers of yearly arrests
thereafter only fell below the million mark once, in 1960 (see Table 1). Before the
petty hooligan decree, hooliganism was a common crime. After it, it became a mass
crime involving the administrative arrest of millions. 
Table 1: Number of persons convicted of criminal hooliganism and detained 
for petty hooliganism in the USSR, 1957-1963
The steep rise in petty hooligan-related administrative arrests was not offset by a
similarly sharp decrease in criminal hooliganism. In the first full year of the petty
hooligan program, the Union’s hooligan conviction rate fell only 6 percent from its
1956 level. In 1958, the rate of criminal hooliganism, instead of falling farther,
actually rose 12 percent to its highest level of the Khrushchev period. On the whole,
the decree did not decrease criminal hooliganism. Instead, it reweighed the
distribution between petty hooliganism, simple hooliganism and malicious
hooliganism by making crimes of the second category into administrative offenses
of the first. As local police and judges turned simple hooliganism into petty
hooliganism in an effort to cut workloads and speed up case turnover, they made a
time consuming and ambiguous class of hooligan cases disappear from crime
statistics and reappear as an administrative offense punishable under the expedited
processes of the petty hooligan program. In this manner, officials did not reduce
hooliganism. They recategorized it. Seeing through the statistics, the USSR
Supreme Court argued that the 1956-1957 reduction in hooliganism “took place not
as a consequence of a decrease in the amount of hooligan activities, but because a
significant number of citizens were brought to administrative responsibility under
Years Number of persons convicted of simple 
and malicious hooliganism in the USSR
Number of persons detained for petty 








Source: GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 50 and op. 1, d. 418, l. 82. Unfortunately,
numbers of arrests and other petty hooligan punishments vary. An alternative 1957 USSR
total, including arrests carried out by the transport police, was given by the USSR Ministry
of Internal Affairs as 1,524,855. For this number, see GARF, f. r-9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 398.
The USSR Supreme Court gave a third estimate of union-wide 1957 petty hooligan punish-
ments as 1,537,689. For this number, see GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 58.
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the petty hooligan decree for actions that had the signs of criminal offenses like
simple hooliganism.”14 
The campaign against petty hooliganism increased hooliganism by making the
police and the courts into manufacturers of deviancy on a mass scale.15 On the up
side, it allowed police officers, prosecutors and judges to speed up turnover times in
petty cases and conserve resources for serious crimes. On the down side, the petty
hooligan campaign made millions of Soviet citizens who had no prior arrest records
into deviants, stigmatized them with an outsider identity, introduced them to the
criminal subculture of the Soviet penal system and launched some of them onto a
new career in crime. 
This was especially true of the repeat petty hooligan offenders who made up a
sizable minority of the detainees.16 For persons arrested multiple times, the petty
hooligan program disrupted the world of work and family and turned life into a
rotating round of short-term incarcerations. These repeat offenders were at
particular risk for falling into petty thievery and more serious types of hooliganism
upon release. Instead of being reformed into better workers, they were remade into
bigger and better offenders. The fact that 30-50 percent of the hooligans convicted
in criminal courts in the mid-1960s were alumni of the petty hooligan program
14. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 60-61. Moreover, the union-wide decreases seen in the
statistics were also achieved through mechanisms that had little to do with the petty hooligan
decree. For instance, the amnesty declared for the fortieth anniversary of the 1917 Revolution
took many simple hooligan cases out of the courts, depressed conviction rates, and contributed
to the decrease noted in union crime statistics. The amnesty decreed that cases be dismissed for
all crimes whose punishments were less than three years imprisonment. This included simple
hooliganism which had a maximum punishment of one year’s imprisonment. For a text of the
1957 amnesty, see Sbornik dokumentov po istorii ugolovnogo zakonodatel´stva SSSR i
RSFSR: 1953-1991 (Kazan: Izdatel´stvo Kazanskogo universiteta, 1992), 35-36. For the
amnesty’s effects on rates of criminal hooliganism, see GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 52-
53. Nor did the deceptive decree reduce the amount of personal accusation cases clogging up
the court system. These cases were on the rise as well. In the first half of 1957 the amount of
personal accusation cases increased from 145,797 (in the first half of 1956) to 153,164. See
ibid, 2. The more pronounced drop in the hooligan conviction rate in 1959 and 1960 was also
not due to the petty hooligan program. This drop was caused, instead, by a widespread
campaign to ship hooligans out of the criminal justice system and send them to their work
collectives for reform and reeducation (perevospitanie): a campaign that was set off by
Khrushchev’s landmark 1959 speech to the Third Congress of Soviet Writers. For
Khrushchev’s speech, see Tretii s´´ezd pisatelei SSSR: stenograficheskii otchet (M.: Sovetskii
pisatel´, 1959), 225.
15. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 617, l. 137.  
16. Recidivism was a pressing problem in the petty hooligan program. Deviants could only be
arrested for petty hooliganism three times in one year. Offenses past the three-strike per year
limit would be tried as simple hooliganism and merit criminal rather than administrative
punishment. However, the three strikes rule was often difficult to enforce and many petty
hooligans became chronic repeat offenders who were constantly circulating through the petty
hooligan system. The satirical journal Krokodil told the story of a petty hooligan who had been
arrested eight times for petty hooliganism in a single year and spent a total of one quarter of that
year (95 days) under administrative arrest. It joked that “when [he] enters the prison the police
greet him like an old acquaintance (znakomogo).” V. Titov and Z. Iur´ev, “100 interv´iu s
khuliganami,” Krokodil, no. 34 (1961): 5.
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showed the success of the new system in creating the very type of crime that it was
designed to stop.17
Making the innocuous into the imprisoning and vice versa
Those arrested for petty hooliganism were, like their criminal counterparts,
generally drunk, urban male workers over the age of twenty-five with an
incomplete secondary-level education and no prior criminal record.18 Instead of
being marginals existing at the outskirts of civilized society, petty hooligans, in
terms of their demographic and occupational profile, were fairly typical
representatives of the dynamic industrializing and urbanizing society of the
Khrushchev period. It was not their identity that set them apart from civilized
society. It was their actions and the way others interpreted and applied deviant
labels to them that made these people into petty hooligans.
Most petty hooligans were arrested for obscenity on the streets and in other
public places.19 Yet even obscene speech in the home could result in petty hooligan
prosecution as in the case of a 42-year-old bookkeeper from Moscow who was
imprisoned for five days for cursing “in the presence of his wife and children.”20
Insults (oskorbleniia) also resulted in a wide range of petty hooligan prosecutions:
insults that ran the gamut from the standard ugly epithets of arguing husbands and
wives to trivial everyday exchanges in which a man called his neighbor a “witch”
and a collective farmer remarked that the livestock specialist was “standing around
like a stone.”21 
After obscene and insulting speech, “pestering” (pristavanie) was another
common form of petty hooligan behavior. Pestering could take many forms
including propositioning women, exposing oneself in a public place, pushing
pedestrians urinating in public, and harassing bystanders.22 It could also take more
obscure forms as in the case of a fifty-one year old unemployed man who was given
fifteen days for pestering customers at a store to drink vodka with him and a sixteen
year old boy who was given fifteen days for throwing snowballs “with mischievous
17. For information on the proportion of former petty hooligans in the sample of convicts for
criminal hooliganism, see Kuznetsova, “Izuchenie i preduprezhdenie...,” 441.
18. GARF, f. A-428, Verkhovnyi sud RSFSR, op. 3, d. 498, l. 4. Of the petty hooligans tried in
the first half of 1966, 70 percent were workers, 75 percent were over the age of twenty-five and
75 percent had an education up to the seventh level (klass).
19. In Stalino, the majority of petty hooligans (659 out of 806) who were arrested in the
beginning of 1957 were detained for cursing. Of the 1,403 petty hooligans arrested in Latvia
during the first few months of the decree’s operation, more than 30 percent  (552) were
detained for “using foul language in a public place.” GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 53.
20. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 96.
21. The bad neighbor got fifteen days and the collective farmer five. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32,
d. 5318, l. 38, 106.
22. A 43-year-old Muscovite was given fifteen days for exposing himself in a store. For this
case, see GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 99.
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intent.”23 Often, petty hooligan-related pestering took the form of “making noise.”
This often applied to shouting on the streets at late hours but could also be utilized
for domestic noisemaking and loud arguments, as in the case of a 40-year-old
unemployed woman who was given ten days for banging on her apartment table
with her fists at 1 a.m. and shouting obscenities.24 
Like its criminal cousin, a great deal of petty hooligan behavior took place in
apartments and was directed against the offender’s wife, relatives or neighbors. A
Chuvash man, for example, was given fifteen days for beating his parents, chasing
them out onto the street, breaking all the dishes and windows, and trying to set fire
to their house.25 Less spectacularly, petty hooligan punishments were frequently
given to those who, often while intoxicated, argued loudly with their spouses or
children both at home and in public. Minor cases of verbal and physical assault
against neighbors also was a common source of petty hooligan prosecutions as
exemplified in extreme form by the case of a man who invited his neighbor to drink
with him in the communal kitchen, got into an argument with her, ripped off her
dress and grabbed her breast.26 As with criminal hooliganism, the family feud was
one of the most prevalent forms of petty hooliganism and the kitchen rivaled the
street corner as a common place of deviant disturbance.27 
The movement of petty hooliganism to the home bred familiar debates over the
boundaries between private matters and public affairs.28 But it also led to anger and
astonishment that daily forms of urban incivility that were once considered
insignificant were now being treated as imprisoning offenses. The writer Iurii
Dombrovskii, who was imprisoned for petty hooliganism in the mid-1960s, asked
his cellmates why they had been arrested for petty hooliganism and, in the account
he left of his prison experience, he wrote of his amazement over their answers.
Almost all the crimes here are identical: a quarrel (ssora) with the neighbor, a
quarrel with the wife, apartment squabbles (skolki). Not a single one of these
cases falls under the meaning of hooliganism. Instead, they all fall under the
category that used to be called “cases of private suit (dela chastnogo iska).” One
resident quarreled with another. A wife swore at a husband. Something
happened in the kitchen above the gas stove. You could engage in these little
fights as much as you wanted until now. But now, one of the more informed
23. For the snowball and drinking buddy cases, see ibid, l. 98, 323. 
24. Ibid, l. 97.
25. Ibid, l. 246.
26. Ibid, l. 70.
27. For the increasing use of hooliganism against abusive husbands and the growth of domestic
hooliganism (bytovoe khuliganstvo) during this period, see Brian LaPierre, “Private Matters or
Public Crimes: The Emergence of Domestic Hooligan in the Soviet Union, 1939-1966,” in
Lewis Siegelbaum, ed., Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of the Soviet Union (New York:
Palgrave, 2006).
28. See for instance, Tsentral´nyi munitsipal´nyi arkhiv g. Moskvy (TsMAM), f. 901,
Leningradskii g. Moskvy raionnyi narodnyi sud, op. 1, d. 637, l. 74; GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32,
d. 5290, l. 80-82 and d. 4676, l. 45, 113, 335.
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troublemakers or neighbors understands that a campaign is going on and that the
police are interested in entering as many cases of petty hooliganism into their
books as possible (before they were interested in doing the reverse). So he calls
the police. The policeman arrives. He walks off with one of the people and tells
the other person what he needs to write in the case report […] And the next thing
you know, you are sitting in prison for fifteen days.29
The petty hooligans Dombrovskii writes about were victims of an expansive vision
of deviancy run amok. Instead of being rebels raging against the system, they were
accidental deviants. They stumbled unwittingly into hooliganism as their everyday
incivilities (such as arguing, cursing and carousing) and their ways of socializing
(such as binge drinking) were absorbed into the expanding boundaries of a
broadened category of deviance. By walking unknowingly into somebody else’s
enlarged and elastic definition of deviancy, the argumentative, uncultured, uncouth
and eccentric became hooligans and were reborn as outcasts of the Soviet system.
They became hooligan not by lashing out at the Soviet state, but by engaging in the
rough masculine rituals of drinking, cursing and fighting: working class displays of
machismo that were an everyday occurrence in the entertainment-free world of the
Soviet factory town. 
Through the relaxed standards and processing machinery of the petty hooligan
program, the ugly actions of the Soviet everyday were remade into imprisoning
offenses. This process of pushing hooliganism outwards into the ordinary can be seen in
relation to public drunkenness. In a massive expansion of an already outsized
administrative punishment program, an April 1961 RSFSR Supreme Soviet decree
made drunkenness (“in the streets or in other public places”) into a type of petty
hooliganism punishable by a reduced three to five ruble fine imposed by the local
executive committee.30 As a result many people were made into hooligans by the
regular binge drinking that they engaged in as a way to escape the bleakness, boredom
and blur of life under Soviet industrialism.31 Designed to cut down on alcohol-related
crime and raise revenue, the decree made a common leisure-time phenomenon of the
Soviet street deviant and enlarged the sweep of the hooligan label to encompass new
mass forms of misbehavior that were previously non-prosecutable under this elastic
criminal category.
The process of reading deviancy into the uncultured everyday and the innocuous
was aggravated by the ambiguity of petty hooliganism and the interpretative
freedom it gave local police and judges. In introducing the concept of petty
hooliganism, the state expanded the domain of deviance at the expense of clarifying
and standardizing its meaning. They responded to emerging crime problems by
29. Iurii Dombrovskii, “Zapiski melkogo khuligana,” in Iurii Dombrovskii: roman, pis´ma,
esse (Yekaterinburg: U factoriia, 2000), 636.
30. “O dopolnenii ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR ot 19 dekabria 1956 ‘ob
otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,’” Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 16
(1961): 248.
31. A. Radontsev, “Pravil´no primeniat´ ukaz ob otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,”
Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 20 (1964): 29.
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making new hooliganisms without first solving the interpretive problems
associated with the existing hooligan labels (simple and malicious). Continually
differentiating hooliganism’s definitions did not make it easier to apply or to
understand. Instead, it multiplied the opportunities for mislabeling and elicited
growing category confusion as local legal workers struggled to define, in practice,
the ill-defined borders between hooliganism’s multiple meanings.32 With the
creation of petty hooliganism, the state inserted an additional layer of ambiguity
into what was an already inscrutable criminal category.
This ambiguity enabled local police officers and judges to see hooliganism in
novel ways. In their everyday practice of applying crimes to new cases and
contexts, these local agents invested petty hooliganism with new meanings and
opened up the domain of deviancy to new acts and actors. Armed with their own
vision of deviance, local police officers and judges hijacked the state’s petty
hooligan campaign and aggravated the avalanche of incarceration by pushing the
boundaries of hooliganism outward. Empowered by the petty hooligan decree and
the campaign fashioned around it, they pursued their own meaning of petty
hooliganism and, in the process, used (and abused) a fast-track system of
administrative punishment to make both innocuous actors and serious criminals
into a new class of lightweight lawbreakers.
Obscene and abusive speech provides an example of how local police and
judges used the agency and interpretive power that the petty hooligan decree gave
them in order to expand a newly minted and ambiguous category of deviance to
new practices and people. Obscenity was one of the principle targets of the petty
hooligan campaign. Immediately following the passage of the decree, the majority
of petty hooligans were punished for “cursing on the streets and in other public
places.”33 However, police and judges twisted the decree’s anti-obscenity platform
in order to make borderline non-obscene speech hooligan. In the process, they
remade the ill-spoken and the loose-lipped into the deviant.
Expressions and phrases foreign to the linguistic and ideological world of
official Soviet speech were reread as forms of anti-social deviancy punishable
under the petty hooligan decree. For example, a woman was turned into a petty
hooligan not for cursing in public, but for using a metaphor religiously while on the
phone with the deputy chair of the local executive committee.34 In another example
of interpreting an alien expression as hooligan speech, a man was arrested under the
petty hooligan decree for addressing one of the workers at the local housing agency
32. Judges had constant difficulties understanding the practical difference between petty and
simple hooliganism. One of the justices declared at the July 1958 Plenum of the RSFSR
Supreme Court: “The USSR Supreme Court does not give us any concrete suggestions on how
to differentiate petty hooliganism from hooliganism […] and it’s very hard to do this.” The
Ukrainian Supreme Court requested that a ruling be issued that would make “a clear cut
distinction between petty and simple hooliganism,” arguing that “in practice it is difficult to
establish this border [between petty and simple hooliganism].” See GARF, f. A-428, op. 3,
d. 295, l. 2 and GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 618, l. 97. 
33. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 53.
34. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 1, d. 462, l. 62-63.
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as “Mrs.” (missis).35 The interpretive agency and authority that the decree instilled
in police personnel gave them the ability to transform any insulting expression or
gesture, even an imagined one, into an offense punishable under the relaxed
standards of petty hooliganism.36 
Empowered by the ambiguity and fast-track punishment process of the petty
hooligan decree, the police transformed the innocuous rule breakers of the
everyday into hooligan threats to society. By enforcing the partition of parks and
streets into restricted areas and no-go zones with the decree, they were able to make
a school child who ran in a flower garden and a Novosibirsk man who crossed the
street at an unmarked place into petty hooligans.37 The commonplace uncivil
occurrences of life in an urban economy of shortage were reread under the
expansive petty hooliganism decree as new forms of deviancy. A man, for instance,
who butted in line at a furniture store found himself labeled as a hooligan and
sentenced to five days in prison.38 Minor forms of property theft and defacement
were turned into anti-social offenses warranting high-cost incarceration regimes.
For instance, two Alma-Ata residents were given ten-day sentences for picking
flowers for their girlfriends from the roadside. Even the destruction of one’s own
property could land one amongst the petty hooligans. In Odessa, a man who
accidentally locked himself out of his home was sentenced to ten days for breaking
the lock of his own door in order to gain reentry.39 Petty hooliganism acted as a
convenient vehicle for policing social space and maintaining orderliness. However,
it also made the public hostage to the police’s tacit and personal vision of petty
hooliganism: a vision that often turned unheeded steps into administrative offenses
and placed the unmindful onto the path of imprisonment.40
35. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 30. 
36. GARF f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 337. The decree’s ambiguity also allowed authorities to
use it in order to muzzle those attempting to speak out against poor bureaucratic, especially
police, service. For example, a man was sentenced to ten days for his “persistent request” that
the police search for the people who robbed him. In Lithuania, a man, who was called to the
local police station as a witness, was charged with petty hooliganism after he complained about
being made to wait eight hours at the station (ibid.). Other everyday linguistic markers such as
volume drew the attention of zealous police and transformed careless speakers into deviants.
Hooliganism was discovered in the behavior of a man who conversed in a loud voice at his
friend’s home (the sentence also noted that he put his dirty boots on his friend’s couch, see
GARF, f. r-9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 93). Noisemaking in general could be read as petty
hooliganism regardless of content, especially during nighttime hours. Two men, for example,
were arrested for simply making noise after midnight, though the judge refused to press charges
against the two (GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 126). In Voronezh, two restaurant goers
were sentenced to five days for slamming their plates on the table (ibid., d. 5199, l. 18). 
37. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 94. and op. 1, d. 469, l. 105. 
38. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59. 
39. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 1, d. 469, l. 106-107. 
40. Behaviors that did not violate public order but were frowned upon or were unorthodox were
reread through the lens of petty hooliganism as imprisoning offenses. One man, for example,
was charged with petty hooliganism for attempting suicide (GARF, f. r-9474, op. 1, d. 469,
l. 9-10). The same court sentenced a drunken man who asked the police to take him to a
sobering up station to three days (GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 107). A man, who laid on
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Petty hooliganism was not only used to make debatable and borderline
behaviors deviant. It could also be used to transform major crimes into minor
offenses. After public obscenity, fighting and various forms of physical assault
were the second most common form of petty hooliganism.41 Although it was
frowned upon by watchdogs, petty hooliganism was often applied to violent
assaults such as in the case of a man who beat a woman (“until she bled”) for
refusing to dance with him and in the case an intoxicated Leningrader who inflicted
two knife wounds on a bystander.42 Despite the public’s disapproval of “liberal”
approaches to violent offenders, the petty hooligan program gave local officials
incentives to offload violent crime onto the fast-track system of administrative
punishment. Making stabbings and assaults petty hooliganism coddled violent
offenders and allowed them to slip through the criminal justice system. But it also
allowed local police officers, prosecutors and judges to accelerate their case
turnover and conserve scarce investigative and judicial resources.43 By taking cases
out of the criminal courts and putting them in administrative venues, these officials
deflated conviction rates, lowered local crime statistics, created virtual victories
over crime and, at the same time, conformed to campaign pressures to press the
petty hooligan program forward.44 In the process though, they stretched the
meaning of petty hooliganism to encompass actions and actors that were far from
minor or mundane. 
Yet, police officers were far from the only agents involved in reinventing petty
hooliganism. Citizens, in the denunciations they wrote to the police on the alleged
petty hooliganism of their neighbors and relatives, were also actively rethinking to
what concerns and contexts petty hooliganism could be applied. Battered wives, for
example, often sent denunciations to the police asking that their abusive or drunken
husbands be arrested for petty hooliganism.45 Using the decree as a way to draft
public agencies into their private affairs, they attempted, with increasing success, to
expand the application of petty hooliganism from public misdeeds to the seemingly
41. For instance, physical assault (izbienie) accounted for 374 of the 1,403 cases of petty
hooliganism in Riga in 1957. In Stalino, the infliction of knife wounds accounted for 102 of the
806 petty hooligan cases studied in the same year. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 645, l. 53. 
42. Ibid, l. 54. 
43. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 58.
44. See GARF, f. A-461, Prokuratura RSFSR, op. 11, d. 465, l. 38 and d. 457, l. 35.
45. At a January 1957 meeting, the head of the USSR Procuracy, R. A. Rudenko, defended the
right of battered wives to hooliganize their abusers by emphatically resisting the attempts of his
subordinates to limit the use of petty hooliganism in domestic matters: “The position […] that it is
impossible to apply the decree on petty hooliganism to persons committing hooliganism in
private apartments (chastnye kvartiry) is incorrect. In December 1920, V. I. Lenin wrote  ‘persons
who keep their living quarters in a state of filth and violate the rules of public order must be
sentenced to one month of imprisonment.’ Even in these cases, Lenin thought it necessary to
make convictions. Is spousal abuse in a private home (chastnyi dom) really not a public concern?
Even here the decree must be active.” GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5290, l. 80-82.
a couch in the lobby and declared he was an American spy after he was refused a room at the
hotel “Donbass,” received a ten-day sentence (GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59). In all of
these cases, eccentric, odd and self-destructive behaviors were made into petty hooliganism by
an ambiguous decree and the disciplinary system it set into motion.
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private behaviors of the domestic sphere which, the wives argued, was not really
private at all. In the process, battered wives projected their own meanings of
deviance onto petty hooliganism and expanded its application to unforeseen areas
and ends. Rather than being simply objects of the petty hooligan programm, Soviet
citizens adopted the state’s new deviancy decree for their own purposes and, in the
process, shaped its evolving implementation. A German teacher, for instance, used
the decree to discipline classroom troublemakers by sending a denunciation to the
local police about a student who did not prepare his lessons, was rude with his
teachers and cursed in school. The student was sentenced to five days.46 By using
the petty hooligan decree as a way to enforce discipline within their disordered
workplaces and private lives, activist citizens reinvented its meaning, opened new
spaces for its application and fueled the avalanche of incarceration it inspired.
Campaign pressures, idiosyncratic local applications and ambiguity spilled
petty hooliganism from legitimate targets over to illegitimate applications. Noting
the drift of petty hooliganism into misapplication, watchdogs constantly
complained that the decree “was being applied in the localities in an excessively
broad manner.”47 A 1957 report on the implementation of the petty hooligan decree
declared: “The police send a great number of petty hooligan cases to the courts
groundlessly that lack any sign of this violation.”48 As a result, fast-track arrests,
limited investigations and the lack of appeals made illegal detention a frequent
occurrence in the petty hooligan campaign.49 
Instead of safeguarding procedural norms and ending arbitrary arrest, the petty
hooligan program dismantled the former and extended the latter in an effort to
expedite the punishment process and end the persistent hooligan problem. In this
way, the petty hooligan decree seemed to contradict the socialist legality language
that the regime used as its principle discourse of de-Stalinization. The Deputy Chair
of the USSR Supreme Court openly expressed his worry at a 1964 plenum that the
program increased, rather than curtailed, the operation of punitive police power and
made citizens more, not less, liable to arbitrary incarceration.
Before the promulgation of the decree on petty hooliganism, the reasons for the
detention of citizens and their delivery to the police were very narrow.
According to the Criminal Procedural Code, there had to be serious grounds for
doing so. But now the reasons for detaining a citizen are in essence limitless.
Any kind of trivial misbehavior (nepravil´noe povedenie) by a citizen in a public
place or in an apartment can be interpreted as petty hooliganism and lead to that
person  being delivered to the police, brought before the court, and detained […]
We talk a lot about […] safeguarding citizens from groundless arrest and,
therefore, the courts and the procuracy should all give the question [of how to
apply the petty hooligan decree] more attention.50
46. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 16, d. 644, l. 59.
47. Ibid., l. 58. 
48. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 341. 
49. Ibid., d. 5095, l. 158. 
50. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 1, d. 418, l. 83.
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Rather than safeguarding socialist legality, the petty hooligan program threatened
to sacrifice it by producing a large amount of groundless prosecutions and illegal
arrests. The combination of empowerment and elasticity that the petty hooligan
decree brought to local anti-deviance efforts was one cause of the large amount of
groundless prosecutions and arrests. However, the large caseloads generated by the
petty hooligan campaign were another contributing factor to the prevalence of
illegal arrest. Bogged down in petty hooligan cases, local police and judges used
short-cut strategies to speed up turnovers: strategies that increased the likelihood
that unwarranted cases would sail through the fast-track system unchecked.
Coping with an avalanche of offenders
Originally, police officers, prosecutors and judges welcomed the petty hooligan
decree as a way to cut red tape, reduce workloads and speed the turnover of time-
consuming cases of non-serious hooliganism.51 Instead of relying on prolonged
investigations and trials that often took months and ate up excessive resources and
man-hours, the decree set up a fast-track system for trying non-serious cases of
hooliganism. Upon arresting a suspected petty hooligan, the police officer drew up
a short case report. This report would be reviewed by superiors at precinct
headquarters who would then make the decision on whether or not to send the case
to court. The suspect and the case report would then, if warranted, be forwarded to a
judge for an immediate hearing. The decree’s method of trying petty cases based on
instant investigations and telescoped trials promised to boost the power of the
police and streamline the hooligan punishment process. However, the campaign
against petty hooliganism did little to reduce workloads and case volumes. Instead,
it created a flood of new deviants that tied down personnel in paperwork and
processing demands.
The decree required that petty hooligan cases be brought to a judge for
sentencing within twenty-four hours of the initial arrest. Such tight time limits had a
deleterious affect on the quality of case materials. Beat cops and organizational
understaffers, under pressure to increase turnover and with little training on proper
case formatting, produced case reports “on the fly” by cutting out particulars and
omitting the information necessary for proper processing. Many case materials
lacked names, contact information and did not state what petty hooligan actions the
accused was supposed to have committed. Reports often complained that case filers
described the alleged petty hooligan actions committed in an “imprecise and
superficial” language that overused general phrases like “he committed hooligan
acts,” or “the accused caused a ruckus (skandal) and etc.” The use of
generalizations and vague abstractions cut down on paperwork time, but it
complicated sentencing and oversight by concealing case specifics in a
homogenizing language. The lack of detailed information on action and situational
51. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 10, d. 197a, l. 58.  
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context hampered the court in making fair sentencing decisions and often meant
they were passing sentence blindly on ambiguous case materials.52 
The police also cut down on petty hooligan work and aggravated the avalanche
of incarceration by letting others find the petty hooligans for them. The police were
the only agents empowered to draw up reports on suspected petty hooligan activity.
However, apartment residents, club directors, wives and other private citizens
bypassed this restriction by informing on petty hooligans and sending case reports
to the authorities without police participation.53 The police accepted these
denunciations/case reports with little fact checking these denunciations/case
reports and forwarded them to the courts verbatim for sentencing. By
subcontracting out the composition of petty hooligan case reports to third parties,
the police allowed citizens to co-opt the state’s anti-deviancy program, made it
dependent on the questionable testimony of self-interested parties and increased the
amount of false case reports filtering through the system. For example, a man was
arrested for petty hooliganism on the basis of a case report written up by the man’s
live in father-in-law and mother-in-law claiming that he used foul language in the
apartment. No neighbors corroborated the charge and it was discovered that the in-
laws had fabricated it in order to evict their son-in-law from the apartment and
augment their tight living space.54 
In order to expedite the turnover of petty hooligan cases, free up their work
schedules and, at the same time, process petty hooligan cases ahead of time limits,
judges also adopted short-cut strategies. Rushing through low priority petty
hooligan cases was a common time saving strategy that judges used in order to
move petty hooligan cases through the system quickly. Dombrovskii described the
quickness of petty hooligan hearings among his sentencing cohort as a quasi-
military operation that mixed speed with superficiality: “One-two, one-two! The
door [of the judge’s chamber] opened and closed. Next, next, next! A man flew out
with ten to fifteen days every three minutes.”55 The behavior of Dombrovskii’s
judge, who was on the telephone holding a personal conversation during most of his
hearing, showed how hard-up judges saved time in petty hooligan cases by cutting
corners in examinations, rubber-stamping police materials and passing sentence
with little analysis.
Kochetova [the judge in Dombrovskii’s case] turned to the first page of the case
file and looked at the last line […] With a habitual movement she took out a
blank sheet of paper [on which to write the verdict] and grabbed her pen. “So
you committed hooliganism and used uncensored language?” she asked. I
answered […] that I neither fought with anyone nor committed hooliganism, but
was simply trying to protect a woman who was beaten. She again read to me the
52. Radontsev, “Pravil´no primeniat´ ukaz…,” 29-30.
53. GARF, f. r-9474, op. 32, d. 645, l. 34. 
54. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 110. 
55. Dombrovskii, “Zapiski melkogo khuligana…,” 624.
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last words of the police report. My words had no impact on her whatsoever. She
was not interested […] She listened and she did not listen. She looked at me and
she did not look at me […] She grabbed a blank sheet of paper. “Well that’s it.
Ten days. Try to draw the right lessons from this.”56
The high caseloads, low priority and tight deadlining of petty hooligan work
prompted judges to adopt questionable trial methods that ignored time-consuming
formalities like calling witnesses, examining case materials for evidentiary gaps
and allowing the accused to defend themselves.57 For example, a man was arrested
for petty hooliganism on the basis of a case report, which was composed by his
former wife and her friend, accusing him of having called his ex-wife a speculator.
Even though the man professed his innocence, the judge refused to call witnesses in
the case, dismissed the man’s complaint that the police report was drafted by
interested persons and sentenced the man to ten days.58 Such tactics saved
schedules from over-swamping, but they also violated the regime’s socialist
legality rhetoric by exposing citizens to arbitrary power with little hope of appeal or
oversight and by causing unwarranted detention.
Putting up the petty hooligan
The heavy case volume generated by the campaign against petty hooliganism
complicated the task of finding holding spaces for petty hooligan detainees. Prisons
were often reluctant to house low priority, short-term administrative detainees and,
at times, refused to open their doors to the stream of petty hooligan arrestees.59
Since the decree mandated imprisonment, local governments were forced to find
and improvise storage spaces for petty hooligans outside the prison system. 
Many localities used the police stations’ preliminary detention cells (kamery
predvaritel´nykh zakliuchenii, KPZ) as petty hooligan storage centers. However,
most KPZs were relatively small area, low capacity spaces that were not designed
to handle the high traffic of the petty hooligan system. Overstuffing and
overtaxing the local KPZ network meant that crowding was a common part of
petty hooligan detention. Reports noted numerous holding arrangements of one
square meter per detainee. In the Moscow oblast town of Khimki, nineteen petty
hooligan detainees were held in a twenty square meter room.60 In Moscow’s
56. Ibid., l. 625.
57. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5290, l. 80. A procuracy official noted: “Even when the
accused denies his guilt there has been not a single case in which the judge has checked the
correctness of what is written in that case report.” See Radontsev, “Pravil´no primeniat´
ukaz…,” 30.
58. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 110. 
59. Ibid., d. 5682, l. 13. 
60. Ibid., d. 5318, l. 26 and d. 4676, l. 32, 112.
MAKING HOOLIGANISM ON A MASS SCALE 365
Butyrka prison, petty hooligans were forced to sleep two to a bunk in order to
maximize occupancy.61 
Local officials had to develop creative policies to counteract KPZ
overcrowding: policies that eroded the punitive power of the petty hooligan decree.
Practices such as early release and house arrest were reluctantly used to free up
detention space. In Ivanovo oblast, female detainees were allowed to go home at
night because of a lack of space at the KPZ.62 In Leningrad, “a significant number”
of petty hooligans were released home because of lack of space in the KPZ. When
space became available, they were rearrested in order to serve out their sentence.63
Overcrowding, in some instances, contributed to the inadvertent criminalization of
the petty hooligan population. The RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
required that male, female, adult and juvenile petty hooligan detainees be held in
separate cells and that petty hooligans as a whole be segregated from more serious
criminals.64 By taking minor offenders out of the ordinary prison population, the MVD
hoped to peel petty hooligans away from the corrupting influence of the hardened
hooligans and criminals they were often lumped together with under the previous
system. In reality, spatial limitations constrained the MVD’s policy of segregated
detention and, at times, forced petty hooligan detainees and general offenders to be
held in common rooms regardless of differences in age and criminal background.65 In
these mixed detention spaces, petty hooligan detainees often fell under the spell of
criminal elements who used the detainees’ relative freedom of movement (during the
time they traveled to and from their work assignments) in order to smuggle
information, instructions and contraband into and out of holding cells and prisons.66
Because of infrastructure constraints, the punishment process turned from a time of
correction into a time of corruption in which some petty hooligan detainees were
exposed and absorbed into criminal subcultures.67
61. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5290, l. 80. Doubling up on bunks may also have been due to a lack
of bedding materials: a shortage that required many petty hooligans across the country to sleep on
plank beds or to bring their own bedding with them. For more on this, see ibid., d. 5318, l. 26. 
62. Ibid., l. 43. 
63. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 232, l. 59. 
64. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 3. 
65. Ibid., l. 32, 40, 112.  
66. RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 232, l. 59 and GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 13. Petty
hooligans’ access to outside stores and foodstuffs (through their travel to off-prison worksites
as well as through the care packages they were allowed to receive from relatives) made them
valuable prison trading partners and back door suppliers of coveted commodities like alcohol.
Their mobility (their ability to travel in and out of prison regularly) also made petty hooligan
detainees vital communication links for ferrying information between criminals in the prisons
and their relatives and criminal colleagues in the outside world.
67. Following the 31 August 1966 decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers “On Measures for
Strengthening the Fight Against Crime,” the RSFSR MVD/MOOP began to address
infrastructure constraints by setting up special holding centers (spetspriemniki) for petty hooligan
detainees in regional capitals and large industrial cities. See V. M. Suslov, “Deiatel´nost´ organov
vnutrennikh del s serediny 50-kh do nachala 80-kh godov,” in A. V. Vladimirovich, A. N. Dugin,
and A. Ia. Malygin, eds., Politsiia i militsiia Rossii: stranitsy istorii (M.: Nauka, 1995), 282.
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Punishing the petty hooligan
Through the campaign against petty hooliganism, the Khrushchev regime decided
to get tough with hooligans by, paradoxically, getting more lenient. Lengthy
incarceration was no longer the punitive policy for non-serious hooliganism. The
petty hooligan decree reduced prison sentences to short three-to fifteen-day stays.
The central punishment for petty hooliganism was the mandatory physical labor
that the detainee had to perform during each day of his incarceration. Echoing the
reforging philosophy of the 1930s, the architects of the petty hooligan policy
believed in the power of physical labor to remake broken men.68 Physical labor was
a reformative instrument through which detainees could mold themselves into
useful Soviet subjects and refind their place in the Soviet system. Moreover,
manual labor would reinforce a work ethic in a deviant subculture popularly
associated with sloth and shirking.
The compulsory labor requirement also seconded as a public system of shaming,
status reversal and exposure designed to make hooligans loose face before their
collectives and communities. Ideally (though rarely in reality), officials tried to set
labor projects in high traffic areas in order to display petty hooligan detainees and
maximize their exposure to the public gaze. Overseers ratcheted up the humiliation
by assigning detainees to “feminine” work duties that crossed gendered notions of
sex-appropriate labor. Exposing detainees to demeaning tasks associated with a
feminized domestic sphere, such as cleaning toilets or sweeping floors, challenged
the self-image of a group infamous for its association with rituals of rough
masculinity like drinking and fighting.69 
In this manner, mandatory public labor acted as a spectacle designed to
embarrass the hooligan and inform (if not entertain) his collective. The logic of
such shame labor spectacles was vividly described in a 1958 Izvestiia article: 
Now the [detainees] are carrying brooms and shovels. The “heroes” of yesterday
are marching along sadly, hiding their faces beneath their coat collars. As they
sweep the street, they try to keep their backs to the sidewalk. And from that
corner one hears sarcastic jokes and laughter […] No matter how the heroes hide
their eyes, the shame of fifteen days of public scorn will be remembered all their
lives.70 
Public clean-up projects, like street sweeping or snow removal, provided an ideal
vehicle for exposing petty hooligans to visible and audible public scorn.71 Through
public works projects, the hooligans’ habitat would be reclaimed and turned into
68. On the reforging rhetoric of the first five-year plan period, see Katerina Clark, “Little
Heroes and Big Deeds: Literature Responds to the First Five-Year Plan,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick,
ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).
69. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5095, l. 154-155, ibid. d. 5318, l. 28 and d. 4676, l. 40. 
70. A. Galkin, “Eto ne kompaniia,” Komsomolskaia pravda, (2 November, 1958): 3.
71. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 31. 
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the stage on which they were displayed before the public eye. The shame of being
paraded before their neighbors and colleagues would, it was hoped, stay with the
petty hooligan forever and speed his reintegration into the collective. 
In addition, local economic imperatives and interests shaped the petty hooligan
labor system and dictated where detainees were sent to work. Petty hooligan
detainees were frequently farmed out to local enterprises for temporary work
assignments as a government-subsidized, on-loan labor force. In this way, petty
hooligan detainees, through their labor, were not only serving out their sentences
and (it was hoped) rededicating themselves to the task of constructing
Communism. They were adding value to the local economy by filling gaps in the
local job market, especially in such low-status or labor intensive sectors as
sanitation or construction.72
However, the compulsory labor system ran into multiple administrative and
supervisory difficulties that contracted the make-work empire and freed detainees
from their labor responsibilities. In particular, administrative negligence on the
local level subverted the petty hooligan work program. Police in Stalingrad, for
example, sent lists of detainees to the local executive committee, but local officials
made no effort to create make-work assignments for them.73 Similarly, detainees in
Moscow’s Krasnogvardeiskii raion were not put to work because the raion had
failed to organize any work projects.74 Local institutions, often ignorant of decree
specifics, passed the buck on creating public works projects for petty hooligan
detainees and shirked their labor assignment responsibilities.75 
The negligence of local governments in creating make-work for petty hooligan
detainees was reflected in the large percentage of detainees who did little or no
labor at all during their incarceration. The USSR Procuracy estimated that only 20-
30 percent of detainees were being put to work in required labor projects.76 In one
raion in Gorki oblast, only one out of seventy-four detainees was sent to work on
each day of his sentence as required by the decree. Most of the other detainees
worked only 10-25 percent of their sentence days.77 
Detainee inactivity undermined the utopian program of reformation through
labor and turned detention into what many critics described as a period of “idle
rest.”78 Vacation, relaxation and leisure rather than status reversal, shaming and
manual labor became the unintentional leitmotifs of a forced labor system on the
skids. The inability to match detainees with physical labor projects prompted
72. Ibid, l. 113. 
73. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 45. 
74. Ibid., d. 4676, l. 47. 
75. Ibid., d. 5318, l. 45. 
76. Ibid., d. 5290, l. 80 and d. 5302, l. 194-195. 
77. Ibid., d. 5318, l. 30. In 1965, Izvestiia reported that only one third of petty hooligan
detainees were actually used in the labor projects the decree required. See V. Baskov, “Porok
istseliat´ trudom,” Izvestiia, (1 April,1965): 3.
78. Galkin, “Eto ne kompaniia,” 3.
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complaints that petty hooligan detainees “eat free bread and do not suffer.”79
Without compulsory labor, prison lost its bite and its transformative power to
remold detainees into model Soviet workers. “Ten or fifteen days is not a reform
measure,” a Leningrad woman wrote in dismay, “it is a time of amusement.”80
Prison for idle petty hooligans had, according to critics, become a “holiday hotel”
(pansionat) in which they spent “vacation.”81 Inadequate work creation and usage
transformed the idle and unrepentant petty hooligan into the popular punch line of
such mass media vehicles as Leonid Gaidai’s film “Operatsiia “y” i drugie
prikliucheniia Shurika” (1965) or the satirical journal Krokodil. Parodying the
laborless detention, a cartoon in Krokodil, entitled “A New Place of Rest,” depicted
two petty hooligans leaving a police station at the end of their detention period and
comparing how much weight they had gained during their incarceration.82 
Bureaucratic neglect at the administrative level endangered the compulsory
labor system. By depriving detainees of public labor projects, administrative
inaction kept inmates unreformed and idle in their cells. Local inattention to make-
work projects kept detainees from laboring in the local economy and transformed
them into an expensive drain on penal resources. Not for the first time and not for
the last time, the inaction and ignorance of little people and local actors threatened
to torpedo the grand strategies of the Soviet state. However, the petty hooligan
program’s primary saboteurs were not the bureaucrats who ignored the system
from the outside. They were the petty hooligan prisoners who wrecked it from
within. Not surprisingly, they had their own thoughts about being pawns in the
state’s shame labor game and proved reluctant to play by its rules. Getting local
authorities to run a small-scale empire of unfree labor against their wishes was a
constant challenge to the petty hooligan project. Making poorly supervised and
completely unmotivated unfree laborers work, stay onsite and not misbehave – that
was the real challenge for the Soviet state. 
Work was at the top of the state’s petty hooligan agenda. But for those petty
hooligans who found themselves at the center of the compulsory labor system, it
was often the farthest thing from their minds. Through various tactics of work
avoidance, petty hooligan detainees sidestepped the shame labor system. By
refusing to work, by running away and by dragging their feet, petty hooligans did
their best to avoid the labor the Soviet state sought to impose on them.
 Flight was one of the most frequent work avoidance tactics adopted by petty
hooligan detainees. The unwillingness or inability of police departments to waste
personnel on escort duties meant that petty hooligan detainees were often sent to
worksites without police escort or in underguarded convoys. Detainees escaped the
compulsory labor system by simply running away while en route to work projects.
In Alma-Ata, the prison sent detainees to work without any guard or escort on the
79. Ibid.
80. GARF, f. r-7523, op. 45, d. 350, l. 17. 
81. GARF, f. A-577, Iuridicheskaia komissiia pri Sovete Ministrov RSFSR, op. 1, d. 882, l. 46. 
82. Krokodil , 36 (1957): 5.
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condition that they return to the prison “around 6-7 p.m.” A spot check found that
only 33 percent of detainees reported to their assigned worksites.83 Persistent
staffing problems turned the escort process into a constant cycle of release and
recapture that tied down police manpower in tracking down and collecting runaway
detainees. 84 In addition, the MVD inadvertently encouraged detainee flight by
depriving escort guards of the right to use weapons against escapees.85 No deterrent
existed to prevent escape attempts and guards in understaffed escort parties could
ill afford to risk mass flights by engaging in foot-races with run-away detainees.
Persistent flight bled the make-work system of a steady labor corps and caused
supply problems that short-circuited working arrangements. In addition, high rates
of flight encouraged the lockdown of detainees in order to break the cycle of
release, runaway and recapture and contributed to the high number of detainees
who were not sent to work.
When they arrived at their worksite, detainees needed constant onsite
supervision to prevent shirking, work stoppages, disciplinary infractions and
escape attempts. This added another layer of costs onto a system that demanded
expensive oversight at every phase of its operation. Frequently, police passed
supervisory functions off onto enterprise managers that often took little or no
interest in diverting manpower to the task of detainee babysitting. Piling the task of
guarding detainees onto the institutions making use of their labor meant that, as one
report declared, “there was really no guard duty provided at all.”86 Many detainees
were unsupervised during workhours and did whatever they pleased. 87 
As a result, many detainees did no work and left the worksite in order to wander
around the city. One petty hooligan detainee in Tiumen oblast left his worksite,
which was supposedly under police guard, went downtown, got drunk and
committed another act of petty hooliganism for which he was sentenced to an
additional fifteen days. In the same oblast, six detainees held a drinking party at
their unsupervised worksite and one ran away.88 Some detainees left the worksites
and returned to their homes.89 One detainee in Moscow, for example, left his
worksite, went home to celebrate New Year’s Eve and then returned to the KPZ
following the holiday celebration.90 Some detainees took advantage of their
freedom of movement and lack of supervision in order to acquire contraband and
smuggle it back into detention centers. In Gorki oblast, four detainees returned to
the KPZ from their worksite drunk and one tried to bring a bottle of vodka back to
83. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 117. 
84. Ibid., d. 4676, l. 8. 
85. Ibid., l. 4. 
86. TsMAM, f. 2842, Prokuratura g. Moskvy, op. 1, d. 65, l. 18.
87. Ibid., l. 113. 
88. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 323. 
89. Ibid., l. 112. 
90. Ibid., l. 8. 
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his cell (the police mounted a contraband search and found several more empty
bottles).91 
The unsupervised detainees who did stay onsite at work assignments exerted
their own control over the work process through a repertoire of shirking and foot
dragging. Work tempi were attenuated and workdays contracted in order to limit
exertion.92 Stoppages disrupted production routines. Without oversight, no
incentive existed for petty hooligans to work. The Secretary of the Komsomol
Central Committee described the working patterns of petty hooligans: “Those who
want to work, they do a little bit of work. Those that don’t want to work, they play
dominos.”93
Hooligans, local employers discovered, were bad workers who added little
value to the production process.94 Medically and physically, many petty hooligan
detainees were ill-suited for physical labor. Some detainees were alcoholics who
suffered from the side effects of alcohol detoxification and withdrawal during their
incarceration and were physically unable to work.95 Unskilled detainee labor
presented a hazard in dangerous worksites, especially in the construction sector,
that multiplied the costs and concerns of using petty hooligan labor. Safety
regulations, for instance, were often ignored or violated by untrained and unskilled
detainee laborers exposing workplaces to increased safety risks and liabilities.96
Facing an unenviable calculus of high supervisory costs and low benefits, many
enterprises refused to take petty hooligan labor. Local enterprises in Kaluga
informed oblast officials that they did not want detainee workers because they “just
sit around all day, drink and run off to their homes.”97 In Sverdlovsk oblast, local
officials refused to create work assignments for the detainees because they argued
that detainees “worked badly and did nothing.”98 The low quality of petty hooligan
workers was a persistent problem that subverted the shame system by undermining
the demand for detainee labor.
The law inadvertently encouraged shirking by failing to give overseers
disciplinary powers over underperforming detainees.99 Localities experimented
with various strategies to compel detainees to work and regain control over the
labor process. In Leningrad oblast, the police informed the detainees’ workplace
about work refusals so that they could punish the detainee for violating labor
91. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 31. 
92. TsMAM, f. 2842, op. 1, d. 65, l. 18. 
93. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial´no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. M-1,
Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii kommunisticheskii soiuz molodezhi, op. 2, d. 391, l. 79. 
94. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 8. 
95. Baskov, “Porok istseliat´…,” 3.
96. GARF, f. A-577, op. 1, d. 63, l. 5-6.  
97. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 13. 
98. Ibid., d. 5318, l. 45. 
99. GARF, f. r-9401, Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del SSSR, op. 2, d. 505, l. 400. 
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discipline or for absenteeism.100 Officials in Kaluga oblast tried to punish detainees
who refused to work by adding a day onto their sentence for each day they refused
to attend their work assignment.101 
Other localities tried to encourage detainees to work through positive incentives,
such as early release and monetary rewards. However, such incentive packages
directly violated the petty hooligan decree and took the sting out of the compulsory
labor system. In Novosibirsk, oblast officials experimented with giving police
chiefs and prison wardens the right to release detainees early “who relate
conscientiously to the work assigned to them.”102 In Gorki oblast, petty hooligan
prisoners were released early for “good work.”103 Although such compensatory
arrangements were forbidden by the decree, detainees were sometimes paid for
their labor giving them a monetary incentive not to engage in shirking and work
stoppages.104 These moves blunted the punitive power of forced labor and
reinforced public concern over the incarceration regime’s insufficient severity.105
The expense of the incarceration and make-work programs cost the state budget
half a billion rubles annually during the first two full years of the campaign (1957
and 1958) and caused persistent imbalances between the large inputs required to
run the compulsory labor system and the limited and low quality output it
generated.106 Basic program expenses, like feeding costs, outstripped the value that
detainee labor added to the local economy.107 Commenting on the shame labor
system’s input/output imbalance, the Secretary of the Komsomol Central
Committee noted at a February 1960 plenum that: “120,000 rubles are wasted on
workers whose labor is worth only 70,000 rubles.”108 
100. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4676, l. 124. 
101. Ibid., d. 5682, l. 6. Following July 1966, the state used food as an incentive to increase the
productivity of petty hooligan detainees. According to regulations, detainees were to be given
hot food only every other day. On the days when no hot food was distributed, detainees
received only their bread ration plus salt and water. However, detainees who exhibited a
“conscientious attitude to their work” were to be given hot food everyday. In order to increase
the sting of the food weapon, petty hooligan detainees were stripped of the opportunity to
receive care packages from relatives or to purchase additional food to supplement the required
prison diet. See the decree “O poriadke primeneniia Ukaza Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ot 26
iiulia 1966 goda ‘Ob usilenii otvetstvennosti za khuliganstvo,’” Vedomosti Verkhovnogo
Soveta SSSR, 30 (1966): 587.
102. GARF, f. A-428, op. 3, d. 281, l. 1-2. 
103.  GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5318, l. 26. 
104. Ibid., d. 5682, l. 62.
105. Only in 1966 would the USSR Supreme Soviet give all localities the disciplinary authority
to punish uncooperative detainees with additional prison sentences (of up to thirty days),
G. S. Sarkisov, Preduprezhdenie narushenii obshchestvennogo poriadka (Erevan: Aiastan,
1972), 24.
106. In 1957, the USSR MVD spent 438 million rubles on administrative arrest programs for
various petty crimes, including petty hooliganism. In 1958, it spent 485 million rubles. GARF,
f. r-9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 399.
107. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 2.
108. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 2, d. 391, l. 79. 
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In order to cut expenses, some localities forced detainees themselves to cover
their own incarceration costs.109 Others sought to trim costs by requiring detainees
to supply their own food and bedding during detention.110 Aside from levying side
charges on detainees, state bodies attempted to recoup costs and address input/
output imbalances by charging workplaces for the petty hooligan labor that they
used. However, they often priced petty hooligan labor out of the market by making
it too expense relative to its limited quality. For example, an order of the
Azerbaijani MVD required workplaces to pay twenty-five rubles into the state
budget for every day a petty hooligan detainee worked at their enterprise. As a
result, a procuracy report observed that enterprises in Baku refused to accept
detainee labor.111 Inadvertently, the state’s cost sharing program, which was
instituted union-wide by an August 1957 joint order of the USSR MVD and the
USSR Ministry of Finance, lowered workplace demand for petty hooligan labor
and jeopardized the work system that was at the heart of the decree’s reformative
program.112 
In an effort to curb program expenses further, the state tried other cost cutting
strategies like passing program costs entirely onto local governments and
instituting alternative punishment practices (like fining or wage garnishments)
that did not involve incarceration or compulsory labor. Yet by passing the costs of
the petty hooligan program to the localities that were already doing a poor job
running the make-work system, the state ensured the program’s continued
problems.113 Disciplining petty hooligans through wage garnishments, fines or by
outsourcing cases to comrades’ courts (the last two instituted in the RSFSR by an
April 1961 decree of the republic’s Supreme Soviet) created its own set of
problems by decreasing the number of petty hooligans sent to compulsory work
programs and undermining the utopian project of reform through labor.114  By
allowing some hooligans to slip through the system easy, it returned to the
ineffective and deviance-promoting days of mixed punishment for minor
misbehavior. With the 1961 decree, petty hooligan punishments traveled full
109. These petty hooligan detainees were charged one ruble per day to cover food costs. GARF,
f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 6612, l. 70. 
110. GARF, f. r-9401, op. 2, d. 506, l. 34-35. 
111. GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 5682, l. 61. 
112. Galkin, “Eto ne kompaniia,” 3. For the USSR MVD and USSR MinFin order, see
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv ekonomiki (RGAE), f. 7733, Ministerstvo finansov SSSR,
op. 46, d. 13, l. 123. 
113. GARF, f. r-9401, op. 2, d. 505, l. 399. The 8 December 1958 decree of the USSR Council
of Ministers shifted the costs of incarceration for both petty hooliganism and petty speculation
onto local budgets starting from 1 January 1959.
114. The 19 April 1961 RSFSR Supreme Soviet decree introduced a 10-30 ruble fine for petty
hooliganism that could be given in lieu of the three to fifteen day imprisonment standard. The
new decree also sought to cut down on caseloads and reduce pressure on the judiciary by
making certain cases (“taking into account the personality of the violator and the nature of the
act committed”) available to be outsourced to comrades’ courts and work collectives. “O
dopolnenii ukaza Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR ot 19 dekabria 1956 ‘ob
otvetstvennosti za melkoe khuliganstvo,’” 248.
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circle away from an expensive forced labor regime and back to the low cost and
low impact repertoire of fines and noncustodial punishments that the program was,
in part, designed to replace.
Conclusion: Putting petty hooliganism in perspective
The petty hooligan program expanded the domain of deviance to encompass
everything from the egregious to the eccentric and turned millions of the male
urban working class into hooligans. By creating new deviancies out of the small
offenses of everyday life, it extended the regime’s disciplinary reach into the
most minor aspects and intimate areas of its citizens’ lives.115 With the
promulgation of petty hooliganism, the regime advertised its intent to enforce
correct conduct and improve byt at all levels of Soviet society and created an
expansive instrument with the catchall quality to accomplish it. As a flexible
instrument of easy incarceration and intimidation, the Khrushchev-era category
of petty hooliganism became (and has remained) an entrenched part of the Soviet
and post-Soviet anti-deviancy arsenal – one that the Soviet state and its
successors have used to hooliganize and harass an open array of stigmatized
social groups ranging from the usual rowdy drunks to, in today’s illiberal
democracies, the embattled political protesters and independent journalists of
post-Soviet civil society.116
115. For the growing intrusiveness of the Khrushchev period, see Deborah Field,
“Irreconcilable Differences: Divorce and Conceptions of Private Life in the Khrushchev Era,”
Russian Review (1998): 600-603 and Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in
Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1999), 279-283.
116. In Belarus, petty hooliganism has been used to detain a political protestor who ripped apart
a picture of Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko and to arrest the hundreds of
demonstrators who publicly protested the March 2006 presidential elections. In September
2004, Andrei Babitskii, the much-persecuted reporter for Radio Liberty, was arrested at a
Moscow airport, on a police provocation, for petty hooliganism. He was detained for five days
in order to prevent him from traveling to the scene of the then unfolding Beslan hostage crisis.
In July 2000, a Vladivostok judge gave Irina Grebneva, editor of the newspaper Arsenevskie
vesti, five days for petty hooliganism. Her misdeed was that she had published, in her paper,
transcripts of telephone conversations of regional politicians (including then Primorskii krai
governor Evgenii Nazdratenko) conspiring to rig local elections. For information on the man
who received petty hooliganism for ripping up a picture of Lukashenko at an anniversary of the
Chernobyl disaster, see United States’ Department of State, “Country Report on Human Rights
Practices 2000: Belarus,” http://minsk.usembassy.gov/html/hrr_2000.html. For information on
the use of petty hooliganism to detain demonstrators protesting the 2006 presidential elections,
see Vince Crawley, “US, Europe Call for Release of Jailed Belarus Protestors,” Washington
File, 23 March 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html? p=washfile-english&y
=2006&m= March &x=20060323144709MVyelwarC0.1266138&t=livefeeds/wf-latest.html/.
For information on the Babitksii incident, see V. Maksimov, “Ban on a Profession?” Novye
Izvestiia, (3 September 2004), in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 35 (2004): 8. Also,
see the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe reprinted online at
https://www.ecoi.net/ doc/en/RU/content/5/1257#s278/. For more on the Grebneva case, see
“Far East Governor Turns the Screws on Another Journalist,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Newsline, 28 July 2000, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/07/280700.asp/.
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When placed in perspective, the history of petty hooliganism presents a
nonstandard narrative of legal reform during the Thaw period. The plot does not
involve reformers replacing an arbitrary Stalinist system of punitive power with a
structure of socialist legality that respected legal and procedural norms. Instead, it
is a story of how reformers, in order to punish minor misbehavior, created a pared
down punishment process that often ran rough shod over both the former and the
latter: a punishment process modeled, in part, on a fast-track system of instant
investigations and truncated trials that was first used in the pre-War Stalin
period.117 Rather than shoring up socialist legality, the petty hooligan decree
sacrificed it in order to realize a project of intrusive behavioral engineering based
on expanding the authority of the state into the trivia of everyday life.
 In this way, the story of petty hooliganism complicates our picture of the Thaw
by underlining the interplay of liberalization and repression, legality and arbitrary
authority and past programs and present reforms that went on within it. The
foundational year of Khrushchev’s Thaw, 1956, began with one of the most well-
known events of the Khrushchev era, the Secret Speech to the Twentieth Party
Congress, and ended with one of the least, the RSFSR decree on petty hooliganism.
These two acts provide two very different visions of this pivotal year. Read from
the perspective of the Secret Speech, the year 1956 appears as a period of
liberalization associated with the challenging of old orthodoxies and authorities.118
Yet seen through the prism of petty hooliganism, it also appears as a time of
repressive social discipline in which the state sought to expand its policing power to
the most mundane aspects of everyday life. Like the anti-gypsy legislation of the
same year, the petty hooligan decree shows us that 1956 was more than a year of
117. In August 1940, the USSR Supreme Soviet, seeking to reduce hooliganism in the
workplace, imposed a one-year sentence on simple hooliganism. This measure kicked off a
campaign that ensnared a broad range of Soviet citizens both inside and outside the workplace
and marked a major escalation in the fight against hooliganism. It also marked a small
revolution in how hooligan cases were processed. Anticipating campaign-related case
increases, the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, the People’s Commissariat of
Internal Affairs of the USSR and the USSR Procuracy issued a joint order that simplified and
speeded up the processing of cases of simple hooliganism. The Narkomiust, NKVD and
Procuracy order ended the extensive investigation and trial of simple hooligan cases. In lieu of
formal investigation, the police would cut processing times by drawing up a short report on the
incident. The trial, based on this pared down protocol, would be drastically telescoped through
tight deadlining. In order to speed up turnover times, hooligan cases would be required to be
heard by judges immediately within 48 hours. Special facilities were set aside for telescoped
trials in special court chambers (dezhurnye sudebnye kamery pri narodnykh sudakh). Out of the
1940 decree, a fast-track system of hooligan processing was born aimed at cutting hooligan-
associated workloads and punishing hooligans “on the fly.” For more on the 1940 campaign,
see Solomon, Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin, 311, 328. For the growing interest in
reviving the 1940 system among mid-1950s legal workers, see RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 36,
l. 31-32, GARF, f. r-8131, op. 32, d. 4013, l. 184 and d. 4032, l. 6, 47. 
118. On the Secret Speech, see William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and his Era (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 270-277; William Tompson, Khrushchev: A
Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 153-161. For an English translation of the
full speech, see Bertram D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin’s Ghost: Text, Background and
Meaning of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).
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liberalizing political reform.119 It was also a year of increased prosecution, coercive
refashioning and aggressive state action against an expanding array of outsider
identities. By showing the limits of liberalization and socialist legality, the petty
hooligan campaign reminds us that a de-Stalinizing society co-existed in an uneasy
equilibrium during the late 1950s with a society of overreaching and increasingly
intimate intrusion, intolerance and the mass incarceration of undesirables.
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119. In October 1956, the USSR Supreme Soviet ruled that gypsies should cease their vagrant
lifestyle (brodiazhnichestvo) and adopt a life of settled wage labor. Those gypsies who
persisted in leading a vagrant lifestyle would be sentenced to five years exile and corrective
labor. For the 5 October 1956 Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet “O
Priobshchenii k trudu tsygan, zanimaiushchikhsia brodiazhnichestvom,” see Sbornik
dokumentov po istorii ugolovnogo zakonodatel´stva SSSR i RSFSR, 31. For more on the 1956
gypsy decree see Alaina Lemon, Between Two Fires: Gypsy Performance and Romani
Memory from Pushkin to Postsocialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 103, 135.
